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The Endangered Species Act: 
Reform or Refutation? 
Brian E. Gray*
Introduction 
Thirty-four years ago, the United States embarked on an auda-
cious quest to reverse and to repair one of the tragic consequences of 
centuries of human development — the extinction of animal and 
plant species caused by conversion of land to agriculture, hunting 
and fishing, industrial activity, population growth, pollution, and the 
damming of rivers.  It was impossible, of course, to restore species 
that had already been lost.  The Passenger Pigeon, the Great Auk, the 
Grizzly Bear in the urban, suburban, and agricultural portions of its 
former range, and (perhaps) the Ivory-Billed Woodpecker, had long 
ago succumbed to predation and loss of their native habitat.  But the 
United States Congress did set out to prevent such future extinctions 
from occurring; and it did so seemingly without regard to the cumula-
tive effects of human development on the remnant populations and 
habitat of those species that were on the brink of catastrophe — the 
American Crocodile, Peregrine Falcon, Bald Eagle, Aleutian Canada 
Goose, Western Gray Wolf, and Pacific Coast salmon, to name but a 
few examples.  The overarching philosophy of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act was to protect and to repropagate endangered and threat-
ened species no matter how dire their current existence and with only 
passing acknowledgement of the reliance interests of those whose 
past activities and future plans placed those species in peril. 
Whether viewed from our perspective or considered in its own 
time, several aspects of the Endangered Species Act stand out as ex-
traordinary.  The first are the circumstances of its enactment.  The 
legislation passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 355 to 4, 
and the Senate gave its unanimous support.1  When President Rich-
ard M. Nixon signed the legislation into law on December 28, 1973, 
he famously declared: 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  This
article is based on a presentation to the Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in Envi-
ronment and Resources at Stanford University on April 20, 2006. 
1. 119 Cong. Rec. 42, 535 (1973) (Senate voice vote); id. at 42, 915-16 (House vote). 
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Nothing is more priceless and more worthy of preserva-
tion than the rich array of animal life with which our 
country has been blessed.  It is a many-faceted treasure, 
of value to scholars, scientists, and nature lovers alike, 
and it forms a vital part of the heritage we all share as 
Americans.2 
The near universal political acclaim for the law, however, should 
give us reason to question whether the members of Congress, the 
President, and the public understood either the Act or the forces that 
it would set into motion.  As a commentator for the Idaho Mountain 
Express wrote on the 25th Anniversary of the legislation:  “The [Act] 
was given scant attention by the general public when it was passed, 
and those who noticed viewed it as a warm, fuzzy law filled with ad-
mirable intention, sort of like a Smoky the Bear billboard with Smoky 
saying ‘Help!’”3 
A second salient feature of the Endangered Species Act is the 
breadth of its coverage.  The legislation does not simply protect the 
“charismatic megafauna” that had been the focus of public and con-
gressional attention.  Rather, the Act commits the United States to 
prevent the extinction of all plant and animal species — from the 
California Condor and the Chinook Salmon to the Texas Blind Sala-
mander, the Desert Pupfish, the North American Burrowing Beetle, 
the Fairy Shrimp, and several hundred conifers, flowering plants, 
ferns, and lichens.4  Moreover, the legislation does not apply only to 
species found within the United States and its territorial waters; Con-
gress sought to use American domestic and international policy to 
protect endangered species in foreign nations and those threatened 
by the over-fishing of international waters.5 
2. Richard M. Nixon, Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 10
Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 1 (Dec. 28, 1973). 
3. Dick Dorworth, The Endangered Species Act: Nixon’s Best Legacy, IDAHO MOUNTAIN 
EXPRESS (Sun Valley, ID) (Dec. 30, 1998), available at www.mtexpress.com/1998/12-30-
98/esa.htm. 
4. For a listing of all animal and plant species designated for protection under
the Endangered Species Act, see 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11 (animals), 17.12 (plants) (2006). 
5. The principal provisions of the Act that address the protection of species in
foreign countries and in international waters are section 8 (international coopera-
tion), section 8A (implementation of the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species and Wild Fauna and Flora), and section 9 (prohibition of takings of 
protected species on the high seas and regulation of imports and exports).  See 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1537, 1537A, 1539.  In 1978, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service promulgated a joint rule that applied the consulta-
tion requirements of section 7 of the Act to federal agency action taken in foreign 
countries.  See 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978).  However, in 1986, the Services published a 
revised rule that limited consultation to agency action taken in the United States or 
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A third significant feature of the Endangered Species Act is how 
different it was from its predecessors.  The authors of the statute 
drew from myriad sources — including the common law of wildlife, 
the Lacey Act of 1900,6 Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918,7 the Black 
Bass Act of 1926,8 and the Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940,9 as well 
as the ESA’s immediate predecessors:  the Endangered Species Pres-
ervation Act of 1966,10 the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 
1969,11 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972.12  Although 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 carried forward many aspects of 
these earlier laws — most notably the inclusion of both vertebrates 
and invertebrates and federal authority to regulate the trade and pos-
session of endangered animals and body parts — the new legislation 
greatly expanded the federal role in four respects:13 
The Act imposed nondiscretionary obligations on the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (USFWS or ‘the Service’) and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) to list species that qualified under the 
statutory criteria for endangered and threatened status.14 
Congress required all federal agencies to ensure that their actions 
would not jeopardize the continued existence of protected species, 
wherever those species may exist15 — a significant change from the 
earlier endangered species acts, which required only that certain fed-
eral agencies “seek to protect species . . . threatened with extinction, 
and, insofar as practicable and consistent with the [agencies’] pri-
mary purposes . . . preserve the habitats of such threatened species 
on lands within their jurisdiction.”16 
The legislation prohibited the “taking” of endangered species — 
a power traditionally exercised only by state wildlife officials — and it 
adopted a broad definition of the take prohibition.17  This change 
in international waters.  51 Fed. Reg. 19926, 19329-30 (1986) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 
402.01).  See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2006).
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (2006).
8. Ch. 346, 44 Stat. 576 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 851-856 (1976)) (repealed 1981).
9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2006).
10. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (repealed 1973).
11. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (repealed 1973).
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h.
13. For an analysis of the significant changes between the earlier endangered
species acts and the 1973 legislation, see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 194-202 (3d ed. 1997). 
14. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a) (listing), 1532(6) (defi-
nition of “endangered species”), 1532(20) (definition of “threatened species”) (2006). 
15. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
16. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 1(b), 80
Stat. 926 (repealed 1973) (emphasis added). 
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).
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would have far-reaching implications as it extended the scope of  
federal regulatory power — which previously applied only to fed- 
eral lands and resources and to the commercial trade in protected 
species — to a potentially broad array of private and state activities. 
Although the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966 had 
recognized that protection of habitat is an important component of 
endangered species preservation,18 the new law required the USFWS 
and NMFS to designate as “critical habitat” specific areas of the 
geographic area occupied by listed species that are “essential to the 
conservation of the species and which may require special manage-
ment . . . or protection.”19 
A final notable feature of the Endangered Species Act is its 
placement in the sequence of statutes that comprise modern Ameri-
can environmental law.  The Act was the fourth of the environmental 
statutes that began the environmental decade — the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, which President Nixon signed into law on Janu-
ary 1, 1970;20 the Clean Air Act, passed later that year;21 the Clean 
Water Act, which Congress enacted two years later;22 and the Endan-
gered Species Act the following year.23  The ESA has some character-
istics in common with the preceding laws: 
• They are all general statutes that regulate a variety of federal,
state, and private activities.
? In enacting these laws, Congress recognized that economic
development and population growth had occurred with little
regard to externalities — loss of open-space, air and water
pollution, risks to public health, loss of wetlands and biodi-
versity, and other social costs — and it sought to restore bal-
ance to historically degraded ecosystems.
• Each law was immensely popular when it was enacted.  All
four statutes enjoyed broad bipartisan support (although
Congress was forced to override President Nixon’s veto of the
Clean Water Act).
18. § 1(c), 80 Stat. at 926.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (designation of critical habitat).  The definition of
critical habitat quoted in the text was added to the statute in the 1978 amendments. 
Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)). 
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006).
22. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
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• Congress acted to encourage public participation in the ad-
ministration and enforcement of these laws by including citi-
zen suit provisions in the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
and the Endangered Species Act.
• Finally, in these three statutes, Congress established complex
regulatory regimes that delegate many important policy deci-
sions to federal administrative agencies:  Which pollutants to
regulate?  What species qualify for protection?  How best to
protect public health?  With what margin of safety?  And how
to proceed in the face of scientific uncertainties and dis-
agreement over policy choices?  These are all questions left to
the expertise of agencies such as the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), the Fish and Wildlife Service, and NMFS.
Yet, in other respects, the Endangered Species Act stands in 
dramatic contrast to its predecessors, and the similarities among the 
statutes potentially mask one essential difference:  Unlike the other 
major federal environmental laws, the Endangered Species Act is not 
an accomodationist statute.  It does not call for a balancing of the 
competing interests.  It generally does not allow for consideration of 
the economic costs of regulation to protect endangered and threat-
ened species.  And, most importantly, the Act makes all of its regula-
tory actions — from species listing and designation of critical habitat 
to consultation and the formulation and implementation of recovery 
plans, reasonable and prudent alternatives, and habitat conservation 
plans — subordinate to Congress’s paramount directive to ensure 
the continued survival of every plant and animal species (wherever in 
the world they may be located) that are currently in jeopardy of ex-
tinction. 
Four Lessons From History 
The circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Endangered 
Species Act largely explain the contemporary controversy over the 
statute, and it did not take long for the radical changes in federal pol-
icy mandated by the Act to become the focus of intense political and 
popular attention.  Four examples (one from each of the last four 
decades) are illustrative: 
1. The “Two Inch Terror”
This was former Senator Howard Baker’s name for his political 
nemesis, the Tennessee Snail Darter.24  The controversy over this tiny 
24. 124 Cong. Rec. 23, 867, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sep. 10, 1979).
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and obscure fish — especially the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in 
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,25 which held that the preservation of the 
species takes precedence over completion a dam separately author-
ized by Congress and months short of completion — revealed several 
features of the Endangered Species Act that were shrouded by the 
ease and swiftness of its enactment. 
First, the Court confirmed that Congress meant what it said in 
section 7:  all federal agencies shall ensure the protection and pres-
ervation of endangered species and their critical habitat, regardless 
of cost or conflict with other important federal programs.  In the 
words of Chief Justice Warren Burger: 
Concededly, this view of the Act will produce results re-
quiring the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the 
project and of many millions of dollars in public funds. 
But examination of the language, history, and structure 
of the legislation under review here indicates beyond 
doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be 
afforded the highest of priorities.26 
The administrative philosophy embodied in this holding (which 
is correct as a matter of statutory interpretation) is a far cry from both 
the technology-based, cost conscious way in which we seek to protect 
air and water quality27 and the multiple use-sustained yield manage-
ment policies we employ in our national forests and other public 
lands.28 
Second, TVA v. Hill demonstrated the consequences of the non-
discretionary directives of the Endangered Species Act and the power 
of its citizen suit authorization.  Once the snail darter was discovered 
in the Little Tennessee River in the vicinity of Tellico Dam, and the 
USFWS concluded (at least at the time) that it was the only known 
population of the species, all other significant decisions followed as 
a matter of law — listing, designation and protection of critical habi-
tat, consultation, and protection through whatever means would be 
necessary to preserve the species.  And these results could be 
achieved by judicial order at the behest of any citizen (at least any 
25. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (“TVA v. Hill”).
26. Id. at 174 (footnote omitted).
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (air pollution emissions standards for new sources);
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (effluent standards for existing point sources of water pollution). 
28. See, e.g., Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531
(2006); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2006). 
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citizen with a personal interest and stake in the controversy), despite 
the contrary judgment of the United States Government.29 
Third, although the congressional debates were dappled with 
references to the Bald Eagle, the Whooping Crane, the American 
Crocodile, and other great creatures that captured the public’s imagi-
nation and sense of stewardship, the Act equally protects the lesser 
and less known species as well.30  As Justice John Paul Stevens asked 
at oral argument, in response to Attorney General Griffin Bell’s dis-
paragement of the claim that a two-inch long fish should imperil a 
multi-million dollar flood control and rural electrification project, 
“Does the Government take the position that some endangered spe-
cies are entitled to more protection than others?”31  The Supreme 
Court’s answer (again, correctly interpreting the will of Congress) was 
a categorical “no.” 
Fourth, the litigation was the first use of the statute for the ulte-
rior and principal purpose of blocking development that opponents 
were unable to defeat through the political process.  A University of 
Tennessee ichthyologist discovered the snail darter in the section of 
the Little Tennessee River that would be flooded by Tellico Dam; a UT 
law student recognized the legal significance of this discovery; and 
the student and his environmental law professor were able both to 
force the listing of the species and to use the consequent consulta-
tion requirements of the statute to stymie a project that they viewed 
as an environmentally destructive boondoggle for residential and 
commercial developers.32  This disingenuous approach to endangered 
species protection probably reached its apex when Andy Stahl of the 
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund told a group of environmental activ-
ists in 1988: 
[T]he northern spotted owl is the wildlife species of
choice to act as a surrogate for old-growth protection . . .
and I’ve often thought that thank goodness the spotted
owl evolved in the Northwest, for if it hadn’t, we’d have
to genetically engineer it. . . . [I]t uses a lot of old growth.
That’s convenient, because we can use it to protect a lot
of old growth.33
29. For a engaging description of the Snail Darter controversy, see CHARLES C. 
MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH’S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 147-75 (1995). 
30. The Act defines “species” as including “any subspecies of fish or wildlife or
plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wild-
life which interbreeds when mature.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). 
31. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 29, at 147.
32. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 29 at 164-69.
33. See WILLIAM DIETRICH, THE FINAL FOREST: THE BATTLE FOR THE LAST GREAT TREES
OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 85 (1992). 
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Finally, TVA v. Hill showed what everyone involved in species 
conservation should have recognized from the beginning — the deci-
sion whether to protect or to sacrifice an endangered species is fun-
damentally a policy (that is to say “political”) choice, rather than a 
scientific or legal judgment.  For Congress had the final word — two 
words, actually — on the Snail Darter controversy.  In an effort to re-
solve the controversy and to avoid similar debacles in the future, 
Congress amended the statute to create an exemption to the strict 
prohibitions of section 7.  An Endangered Species Committee (or 
“God Squad”) now has the power to allow federal projects or federally 
authorized activities to go forward despite the judgment of the 
USFWS and NMFS that the action is likely to cause the extinction of a 
protected species.34  And when the God Squad refused to grant such 
an exemption for Tellico Dam, Congress approved an appropriations 
bill that contained a rider that ordered the dam to be completed 
“notwithstanding any other law.”35 
Congress has exercised this supervenient power on occasion 
throughout the history of the Act.  The most prominent examples are 
the series of “Salvage Timber Riders” that have authorized timber 
harvesting in Northern Spotted Owl and Marbled Murrelet habitat36 
and Congress’s 2003 decision to mandate continuance of full water 
deliveries, despite threats to the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, by pro-
hibiting the Secretary of the Interior from using any funds appropri-
ated for the fiscal year to “restrict, reduce or reallocate any water 
stored in Heron Reservoir or delivered pursuant to San Juan-Chama 
Project contracts . . . to meet the requirements of the Endangered 
Species Act.”37 
Of more importance, though, was Congress’s reappraisal of the 
philosophy of the Endangered Species Act itself.  As Senator Jake 
Garn observed during the debates on the 1978 amendments: 
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(o).
35. 96 Pub. L. No. 69, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50 (1979).  The story of the Snail Darter
has a happy ending, however.  The year after the floodgates at Tellico Dam were 
closed, David Etiner (the biologist who had first identified the Snail Darter in the Lit-
tle Tennessee River) discovered multiple populations of the species in other tributar-
ies to the Tennessee River.  The Fish and Wildlife Service subsequently delisted the 
Snail Darter.  See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 29, at 173. 
36. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).  For a review and
spirited defense of Congress’ practice of changing natural resources policy through 
the rider process, see Jason M. Patlis, The Endangered Species Act: Thirty Years of Politics, 
Money, and Science: Riders on the Storm, or Navigating the Crosswinds of Appropriations and Ad-
ministration of the Endangered Species Act: A Play in Five Acts, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 257 (2003). 
37. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No
108-137 § 208(a), 117 Stat. 1827 (2003); see also Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333
F.3d 1109 (2003).
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As a society, and as a Congress, we have competing re-
sponsibilities.  Beyond the need to protect the environ-
ment, we are also responsible for the provision and 
preservation of aspects of our society which are judged 
desirable by the American people.  These include food 
and water, electricity and other forms of power, and the 
materials we use to make everything from hospital beds 
to golden spittoons for Las Vegas casinos.  Some of the 
uses to which we put our physical wealth are honorable 
and noble; others are certainly not that useful.  But, as a 
society, we must negotiate among them, rather than 
have the Government follow only one value, no matter 
how important.38 
Thus, in the aftermath of TVA v. Hill, Congress finally took a 
close look at the statute it had so blithely enacted five years before. 
2. Mission Blues and “Hapless Toads”:  A Tale of
Two Species
In 1975, the Fish and Wildlife Service promulgated a rule that in-
terpreted the prohibition against the “taking” of endangered species 
set forth in section 9 of the Act39 to include types of destruction or al-
teration of critical habitat.  The rule specifically defines the word 
“harm” as it appears in the definition of “take” to mean “an act which 
actually kills or injures wildlife.  Such act may include significant 
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, in-
cluding breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”40 
Although the Endangered Species Act (like its immediate prede-
cessors) expressly recognizes that habitat protection is essential to 
the task of species conservation, this interpretation significantly ex-
panded the USFWS’s jurisdiction because it extended some of the 
statutory protections afforded “critical habitat” in the section 7 con-
sultation to the Service’s regulation of “takings” of endangered spe-
cies under section 9.41  The effect of the rule is to apply the take 
38. 123 Cong. Rec. 21, 572-73, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 19, 1978).
39. Section 9(a)(1) prohibits, inter alia, the taking of any endangered species
without a permit issued under section 10 of the Act.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2006).  The 
statute defines “take” as meaning “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”  Id. § 1532(19). 
40. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
41. Section 7(a)(2) requires each federal agency to consult with the USFWS or
NMFS to ensure that “any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . 
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prohibition to the use and alteration of habitat (on state and private 
lands) that is essential to the survival of listed species and to other 
activities, such as the exercise of state-created water rights that are 
not covered by the section 7 consultation requirements. 
The Supreme Court upheld the “harm” regulation in 1995 in its 
second famous ESA decision, Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Greater Oregon v. Babbitt.42  The case was brought by landowners, log-
gers, and other individuals in rural communities in the Pacific North-
west and the Southwest who were concerned that the protection of 
Northern Spotted Owl and Red Cockaded Woodpecker habitat would 
limit their ability to cut timber on private and state lands.  As Justice 
Stevens explained in his opinion for the Court: 
[T]he broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's
decision to extend protection against activities that
cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute to
avoid.  Whereas predecessor statutes enacted in 1966
and 1969 had not contained any sweeping prohibition
against the taking of endangered species except on fed-
eral lands, the 1973 Act applied to all land in the United
States and to the Nation's territorial seas.  As stated in §
2 of the Act, among its central purposes is “to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be con-
served . . . .”43
The extension of the take prohibition to habitat located on pri-
vate lands and to the use of resources traditionally left to state regu-
lation has produced two types of responses over the past thirty years. 
The first is creative and constructive, as exemplified by the “habitat 
conservation plan” (“HCP”) forged in 1982 to protect the habitat of 
is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] 
habitat.”  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).  In contrast, the section 9 rule prohibits significant 
habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife.  50 C.F.R. § 
17.3 (1994).  In addition, section 7 applies both to endangered species and threat-
ened species; while section 9 by its own terms prohibits only the taking of endan-
gered species.  By regulation pursuant to section 4(d) of the Act, however, the 
USFWS has generally extended the take protections of section 9 to all threatened 
species of wildlife.  50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a); cf. id. §§ 17.40-17.48 (special rules for the tak-
ing of selected individual species of wildlife).  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit upheld the USFWS’s decision generally to prohibit the taking of threatened 
species in Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 5-8 
(D.C. Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds on rehearing, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev’d on 
other grounds, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
42. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
43. Id. at 698 (citation omitted).
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the Mission Blue and Callippe Silverspot Butterfly on San Bruno 
Mountain while accommodating the landowner’s desire to develop 
its property for residential purposes.  This HCP, the first of its kind, 
set aside and protected a core area of the lupine, thistle, and coastal 
buckwheat that are the butterflies’ source of food and critical habitat. 
While it authorized construction of homes and streets on a portion of 
the mountain adjacent to the protected area (including 14 percent of 
the butterflies’ existing habitat), it also limited the size and location 
of the development, restricted the use of certain pesticides and her-
bicides within the subdivision, prohibited the planting of potentially 
invasive exotic species, and established a number of other conditions 
on construction and use of the homes to protect the butterflies’ “cru-
cial habitat” from erosion, pollution, and other encroachment by 
residents and visitors.44 
The Mission Blue HCP was a profoundly influential event in the 
history of the Endangered Species Act in two respects.  It moved 
Congress to amend the Act in 1982 to allow the USFWS and NMFS to 
grant “incidental take permits” — permits that authorize the taking of 
individual members of a protected species as unavoidable incidents 
to “otherwise lawful activities” subject to regulation under the stat-
ute, such as development in areas of critical habitat. The 1982 
amendments also codified the accommodation strategy created in 
the San Bruno Mountain case, by making incidental take permits sub-
ject to compliance with a “habitat conservation plan” approved by 
USFWS or NMFS. 45  As Michael Bean and Melanie Rowland have ob-
served,  
[The incidental take permit authority] seems to ease the 
Act’s restrictions because it permits what previously was 
prohibited.  In fact, however, this provision likely in-
creased the Secretary’s leverage over activities that inci-
dentally take endangered species because it substituted 
a flexible regulatory authority for a threat of prosecution 
[for the taking of members of a protected species popula-
tion] that few found credible.46 
Indeed, the second great contribution of the Mission Blue HCP 
was its service as a model for exactly this type of flexible and con-
structive regulation of private activities that threaten to encroach on 
44. SAN BRUNO MOUNTAIN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN STEERING COMM., SAN
BRUNO MOUNTAIN AREA HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN (1982). 
45. The incidental take permitting authority and habitat conservation plan re-
quirements are codified in section 10(a) of the Act.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). 
46. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 13, at 234.
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critical habitat or otherwise interfere with federal efforts to protect 
and to recover endangered species.  Based on the new authority cre-
ated by the 1982 amendments, the Fish and Wildlife Service has ne-
gotiated a variety of HCPs, multi-species conservation programs, and 
other agreements that allow for the accommodation of economic de-
velopment and resource use while also protecting listed species and 
their critical habitat.  The most creative and successful of these en-
deavors have included the additional elements of integrated and 
adaptive resource management, coordinated implementation of the 
array of federal, state, and local laws that govern the land or resource 
in question, and protection of private property rights through “no 
surprises” guarantees or compensation agreements.47 
There is a darker path that also followed, however, from the in-
clusion of habitat modification in the section 9 regulatory process. 
That path led to contentious litigation and political debates over the 
legality and fairness of extending the reach of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act to private lands and to activities that traditionally have been 
governed by state and local laws, rather than by the federal govern-
ment.  The past 30 years have been marked by a series of lawsuits 
brought by farmers, ranchers, developers, water users, and other in-
dividuals whose property rights suddenly were limited by section 9 
and the interpretative rule.  Prominent examples include the Palila 
litigation involving wild sheep grazing on the Island of Hawaii;48 Sweet 
Home and related Spotted Owl and Marbled Murrelet cases in the Pa-
cific Northwest;49 and lawsuits brought by developers contesting re-
strictions on construction to protect the California Gnatcatcher.50  The 
USFWS’s announcement earlier this year that it has designated 
450,000 acres in the Sierra Nevada and along the California Coast as 
critical habitat for the Red-Legged Frog is likely to prompt similar 
litigation.51 
Indeed, several of these cases not only claimed that the federal 
government overstepped its jurisdiction to regulate critical habitat on 
private lands; they also serve as poster children for the broader ar-
gument that the administration of the Endangered Species Act itself 
has gone seriously awry: 
47. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS: THE QUIET 
REVOLUTION (1998) available at http://www.fws.gov/Endangered/hcp/Quiet/quietrev.html 
(last visited November 11, 2006); Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the En-
dangered Species Act: No Surprises and the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371 (1996). 
48. Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
49. See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996).
50. Endangered Species Comm. of the Bldg. Indust. Ass’n of Southern California v. Babbitt,
852 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 1994). 
51. 71 Fed. Reg. 19244 (Apr. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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• Construction of a county hospital and regional emergency
medical center in San Bernardino County is halted to protect
the habitat of the Deli Sands Flower-Loving Fly.52
• A commercial shopping center outside of Austin, Texas is
blocked because the development site sits atop a limestone
cave cluster that is home to six endangered species of bee-
tles and arachnids.53
• A residential real estate development in San Diego County is
stymied because it would encroach on the habitat of the Ar-
royo Toad.54
Although the federal courts in all three cases rejected constitu-
tional challenges to the Endangered Species Act, applications of the 
Act to regulate land use activities that traditionally have been the 
province of state and local laws have fostered the political argument 
that the critical habitat provisions of the statute must be curtailed. 
The “hapless toad” — to use John Roberts’ sobriquet — even played a 
cameo role in our new Chief Justice’s confirmation hearings.55 
What Goes Around, Comes Around 
In December 1992, in the waning days of the first Bush Admini-
stration, the Interior Department settled a lawsuit filed by the De-
fenders of Wildlife and the Fund for Animals, which claimed that the 
USFWS had violated its nondiscretionary duty under section 4 of the 
Endangered Species Act to list species that qualified for protection 
under the statutory definition of “endangered” and “threatened.”  The 
settlement committed the Service to list 400 species (in addition to 
the 749 already on the endangered and threatened list) over the next 
four years and to study another 900 candidate species for protec-
tion.56  The spokesman for the Department of the Interior, Steven 
Goldstein, acknowledged that the settlement left the incoming Clin-
ton Administration with an enormous management challenge.  “One 
thing is clear,” he said, “[t]he Clinton Administration now will have to 
address the full force and effect of the Endangered Species Act.  It 
52. National Home Builders Association v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
53. GDF Realty Investments v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
54. Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
55. See Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (2003) (Roberts, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
56. See Keith Schneider, U.S. to Act Faster on Saving Species, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1992, at A1. 
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will be interesting to see if the environmentalists are still their best 
friends in four years.”57 
They weren’t.  But that is too long of a story to explore here. 
Just about everyone agrees, though, that the 1992 listing settlement 
imposed a Sisyphean task on the Fish and Wildlife Service.  First, it 
would be impossible to conduct the biological and commercial stud-
ies required to support the decision to list an average of 100 species 
per year in accordance with the statutory criteria (not to mention ful-
filling the obligation to evaluate an additional 900 candidate species) 
by September 30, 1993.58  Second, section 4 of the Act requires the 
Service to proceed by rulemaking, which increases both the time and 
cost of agency decisionmaking.59  Third, for every species listed, the 
Act imposes an additional nondiscretionary duty to designate critical 
habitat concurrently with the listing of the species.60  Fourth, except 
in exceptional cases, the Service must develop a recovery plan for 
every listing.61  Fifth, each new species listed expands both the con-
sultation obligations the USFWS and other federal agencies,62 and the 
listing of new species increases the number of incidental take per-
mit/habitat conservation plan requests that the Service must evaluate 
and negotiate.63 
The Clinton Administration’s efforts to comply with the settle-
ment were not aided by Congress’s rescission of all funding for listing 
and designation of critical habitat during fiscal year 1995.64  More 
generally, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt repeatedly ex-
pressed the view that the obligations imposed by the 1992 listing set-
tlement and by the concomitant duty to designate critical habitat 
were “cannibalizing” the funds needed for the Clinton Administra-
tion’s efforts to construct comprehensive species management plans 
and negotiated regional settlements of endangered species contro-
versies.65 
In one of history’s ironies, shortly after taking office the current 
Bush Administration asked Congress to impose a moratorium on its 
obligation to list species for protection.   According to Stephanie 
57. Id.
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1).
59. Id. § 1533(a)(1).
60. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
61. Id. § 1533(f)(1).
62. See id. § 1536(a)(2).
63. Id. § 1539(a).
64. Pub. L. No. 104-06, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995).  The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit upheld the rescission of funds in Environmental Defense Center v. Bab-
bitt, 73 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1995). 
65. See Jennifer Lee, Money Gone, U.S. Suspends Designations of Habitats, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2003, at A6. 
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Hanna, spokeswoman for the Interior Department, “We want a chance 
to establish our own priorities, instead of just waiting for another 
court order to roll across the transom.”66  In any event, the experience 
of the past three presidential administrations suggests that there is 
bipartisan sentiment that the mandatory duties imposed by section 4 
of the Act to list species and to designate critical habitat skew the 
administration of the endangered species conservation program away 
from the crisis spots and opportunities for creative solutions by con-
tinually adding new species that, with limited resources, must be 
evaluated and protected. 
“Takings” and Takings 
The Endangered Species Act also has been controversial be-
cause it frequently limits the exercise of private property rights and 
on occasion requires a fundamental change in long-standing land 
use or resource allocation practices.  Farmers who cannot plow fields 
that are Fairy Shrimp or Elderberry Bark Beetle habitat, ranchers who 
must build fences to keep their livestock out of streams inhabited by 
the Lahontan Cutthroat Trout, and developers who must scale back 
their plans to exclude San Francisco Garter Snake habitat have all 
complained that they are unfairly asked to bear the costs of a statute 
that was enacted to protect the national interest in the preservation 
of endangered and threatened species. 
Although there have been surprisingly few cases to date chal-
lenging the application of the Act as an unconstitutional taking of 
private property, three western water cases have focused national at-
tention on the conflict between species conservation and private 
property rights.  Water users in California’s San Joaquin Valley have 
sued the United States, claiming that the biological opinions for the 
coordinated operation of the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and the 
State Water Project (“SWP”) breached their contract rights by reallo-
cating water from consumptive uses to the protection of the Sacra-
mento River Winter Run Chinook Salmon and the Delta Smelt.67  
These hybrid water shortages — the result of drought and ESA man-
dates — caused partial reductions in water service.  Ironically, the 
SWP users, who lost only about 10 percent of their normal water ser-
vice for two years, won their case and received $28 million in dam-
66. See Douglas Jehl, Moratorium Asked on Suits that Seek to Protect Species, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001, at A1. 
67. See, e.g., O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995); Stockton East Water
Dist. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 515 (2006); Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United 
States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). 
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ages and interest for the taking of their property rights.68  In contrast, 
the CVP users, who incurred a 50 percent shortfall in 1993 and have 
suffered lesser shortages in most years since, thus far have been de-
nied compensation based on the federal courts’ interpretation of 
their water service contracts with the United States.69 
The focal point of the property rights movement’s attack on the 
Endangered Species Act, however, has been in the Klamath Basin.  In 
2001, most farmers in the basin received no water from the Klamath 
Irrigation Project, because the biological opinion governing project 
operations required the Bureau of Reclamation to leave water in pro-
ject reservoirs for the benefit of the Short-Nosed and Lost River 
Suckers.  The following year, the Bureau provided full water deliver-
ies, but 40,000 to 70,000 Chinook Salmon washed up dead on the 
banks of the Klamath River because of low flows and high water tem-
peratures in the river.70  A federal court has so far rejected the farm-
ers’ $1 billion takings and breach of contract claims.71  Since 2001, 
however, the Klamath tragedy has stood as a symbol of the tensions 
the Act creates between endangered species conservation and private 
property rights. 
Contemporary Criticisms 
On basis of this history, contemporary critics of the Endangered 
Species Act argue that the statute is flawed and must be overhauled. 
The strongest manifestation of these criticisms was H.R. 3824,72 the 
“Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005,” which 
passed the House of Representatives in September 2005 by a vote of 
229 to 193.73  Although the principal author of the legislation, Richard 
Pombo, lost his seat in Congress in the 2006 general election, the 
criticisms of the Endangered Species Act that motivated the legisla-
tion are likely to remain an important part of our political debate. 
68. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001),
damages awarded, 59 Fed. Cl. 246 (2003), interest calculated, 61 Fed. Cl. 624 (2004). 
69. See O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).  The Court of Federal
Claims will analyze the contract claims of the plaintiffs in the Stockton East case at 
trial.  See Stockton East Water District v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 515 (2006) (denying the 
United States’ motion for summary judgment). 
70. See Deborah Schoch, Dreams Dry Up in Klamath Basin, L.A. TIMES, July 23,
2001, at A1; Timothy Egan, As Thousands of Salmon Die, Fight for River Erupts Again, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at A1; Eric Bailey, U.S. Report Cites Low Levels in Klamath River for 
Fish Die-Off, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at B6. 
71. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005).
72. Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824,
109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). 
73. 151 Cong. Rec. H8546 (Sept. 29, 2005).
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1. The Act Has Failed to Achieve Its Fundamental Purpose
of Recovery and Delisting.
According to former-Representative Richard W. Pombo, the “En-
dangered Species Act has become a program that checks species in 
for protection, conservation, and recovery, but never checks them 
out.”74  Of the 1,304 domestic species that have been listed for protec-
tion under the statute, only 12 have been recovered and delisted. 
Moreover, according to the USFWS, only 30 percent of the 1,265 cur-
rently listed species are “stable” and only 9 percent are “improving.”75  
In Representative Pombo’s opinion, these data show that the Act has 
failed to achieve its fundamental purpose of recovery and delisting, 
and the Act itself “is becoming more and more of an unsustainable 
program.”76 
2. The Current Statute Forces the Fish and Wildlife Service
to Designate Critical Habitat Prematurely and in Some
Cases Unnecessarily.
Representative Pombo and other critics believe that the Endan-
gered Species Act compels the Fish and Wildlife Service to spend too 
much of its administrative time and budget on the designation of 
critical habitat simultaneously with the listing of new species.  He 
notes that in fiscal year 2003, the Service ran out of funds for this 
work and had to suspend its evaluation of critical habitat for five 
months.  Quoting Bruce Babbitt, Mr. Pombo urges that the “best al-
ternative is to amend the Endangered Species Act, giving biologists 
the unequivocal discretion to prepare maps when the scientific sur-
veys are complete.  Only then can we make meaningful judgments 
about what habitat should receive protection.”77 
74. Richard W. Pombo, The ESA at 30: Time for Congress to Update and Strengthen the
Law, CTR. FOR THE DEFENSE OF FREE ENTERPRISE, 2005, available at http://www.cdfe.org/ 
esa_reform1.htm. A more comprehensive critique of endangered species policy is set 
forth in the Majority Staff Report to the House Committee on Resources: Implementation of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973. 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 2005) (report not officially 
adopted by the Committee on Resources), available at http://resourcescommittee. 
house.gov/issues/more/esa/implementationreport.htm.  For a defense of the current 
Endangered Species Act, see Earthjustice, Citizen’s Guide to the Endangered Species Act, 
2003, available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/reports/Citizens_Guide_ESA.pdf. 
75. Pombo, supra note 74, § II.
76. Id.
77. Id. at § III.
 West  Northwest, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 2007 
18 
3. Citizen Suits Have Perverted the Administration of the
Law.
As Mr. Pombo has explained, the “law of unintended con-
sequences has been especially unkind to the Endangered Species 
Act. . . . By filing inordinate numbers of lawsuits under the ESA, envi-
ronmental organizations have handcuffed the USFWS to courtroom 
defense tables, draining the time, money, and manpower Congress 
intended the service to spend on species recovery in the field.”78  He 
then goes on to quote an analysis of federal endangered species pol-
icy by Jason Patlis, former Majority Counsel for the Senate Commit-
tee on Environment and Public Works: 
This is where the [USFWS] is today:  the decisions re-
lating to ESA listings and designations, arguably the 
most important decisions under the law because they 
trigger all other protections, are driven solely by litiga-
tion.  The [USFWS] has lost all flexibility in making its 
own determinations as to which species is most en-
dangered and should be listed first, and which habitat 
is most vulnerable and should be designated as criti-
cal.  Litigation-driven actions prioritize only those spe-
cies that have a plaintiff behind them (and often a 
larger political objective), rather than those species 
that are most endangered.79 
4. The Act Has Been Implemented on the Basis of
Unreliable Science.
Critics of the current Endangered Species Act also argue that the 
term “best scientific and commercial data available” — which serves 
as the basis for listing decisions, designation of critical habitat, and 
consultation — is both vague and poorly understood.  In Representa-
tive Pombo’s opinion, the “absence of clear, objective standards has 
resulted in a litany of data errors and poor decisions on species pro-
tection and critical habitat designations.  These errors waste valuable 
agency resources that could be spent on species in proven need of 
recovery efforts.”  He cites the National Research Council’s tentative 
conclusion that the 2001 forced allocation of water from Klamath Ba-
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Patlis, supra note 36, at 260).
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sin farmers to the two endangered suckerfish had “no sound scientific 
basis.”80 
5. The Act Improperly Interferes with Private Property
Rights.
Representative Pombo identified two aspects of ESA manage-
ment as problematic for property owners.  The first is the incentive to 
rid one’s land of endangered or threatened species, or to destroy 
their habitat, before the full force of the law is applied to the private 
property. Pombo and many others call this the “shoot, shovel, and 
shut up” syndrome.81  The second problem is that the Act has blocked 
development, prevented land from being farmed, interfered with tim-
ber-harvesting rights, and directed water resources away from agricul-
tural users for the benefit of fish and other protected aquatic species. 
Again citing the Klamath controversy, Representative Pombo asserts 
that it and “hundreds of other horror stories and cases of government 
abuse under the ESA have fostered an adversarial relationship be-
tween government regulators and private property owners.  This is in-
credibly deleterious to the goal of saving species because over 90% 
have habitat on private lands.”82 
The Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act 
 In one form or another, all of these criticisms of the Endan-
gered Species Act found their way into H.R. 3824, which would have 
amended the existing statute in eight important ways: 
1. “Best Available Scientific Data”
The legislation would have redefined the term “best scientific 
and commercial data available” — which is the basis for many impor-
tant decisions, including listing, designation of critical habitat, con-
sultation, and the formulation of reasonable and prudent alternatives 
— to “best available scientific data.”83  These data must be empirical 
or “found in sources that have been subject to peer review by quali-
fied individuals recommended by the National Academy of Sciences 
80. Id. (citing National Research Council, Interim Report from the Committee on En-
dangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin: Scientific Evaluation of Biological 
Opinions on Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin (2002) (prepublica-
tion copy). 
81. Id. § IV-V.
82. Id. at § V.
83. Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824,
109th Cong. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2005). 
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to serve as independent reviewers for a covered action in a generally 
acceptable manner.”84 
2. Listing
H.R. 3824 would have amended the listing requirements of the 
statute to direct the USFWS “to determine any distinct population of 
any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife to be an endangered species 
or a threatened species only sparingly.”85  It also would have compelled 
the Service, concurrently with listing, to prepare an analysis of the 
economic impact and effects on national security of listing, but 
would not substantively alter the listing decision in any way.86 
3. Critical Habitat
The legislation would have repealed all references to critical 
habitat in § 3 (definitions); § 4 (designation of critical habitat concur-
rently with listing); § 7 (consultation); and § 10(j) (experimental 
populations).87  Although Representative Pombo previously sug-
gested that the designation of critical habitat should be made as part 
of the formulation of recovery plans for individual or multiple spe-
cies, his bill instead would have simply eliminated the designation of 
critical habitat altogether. 
4. Recovery Plans and Land Acquisitions
The bill would have moved the statutory duty to develop and 
implement recovery plans, and to monitor the status of species listed 
for protection, from section 4 (listing) and merge it with the land ac-
quisition authority set forth in section 5.88  This connotes a policy 
preference for recovery of species that inhabit private lands princi-
84. Id. § 3(a)(2)(C)(ii) - (iii).
85. Id. § 4(a)(2).
86. Id. § 4(d).  The bill would have added a new subsection 4 to section 4(a) of
the statute, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a), directing the Secretary, concurrently with the deci-
sion to list a species as endangered or threatened, to prepare an analysis of: 
(i) the economic impact and benefit of that determination;
(ii) the impact and benefit on national security of that determination; and
(iii) any other relevant impact and benefit of that determination.
H.R. 3824 § 4(d)(1).  It went on to say, however, that “[n]othing in this paragraph 
shall delay the Secretary’s decision or change the criteria used in making [the listing] 
determinations.  Id. § 4(d)(2). 
87. H.R. 3824 § 5.
88. Id. § 9(a).
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pally through voluntary land management agreements, rather than by 
regulation and HCPs imposed on the landowner or resource user 
through the incidental take permit process.  Indeed, the legislation 
would have established a “Threatened and Endangered Species In-
centives Program” through which the Fish and Wildlife Service may 
enter into “Species Recovery Agreements” and “Species Conservation 
Contract Agreements” with property owners and resource users.89 
This program was modeled on the law of conservation ease-
ments and on the Clinton Administration’s HCP implementation pol-
icy, which in many cases included “no surprises” agreements with a 
commitment to compensate the landowner if new listings, new scien-
tific information, or other unforeseen circumstances required the 
United States to restrict the use of land or resources in ways not cov-
ered by the HCP.90  A landowner who enters into one of these agree-
ments must commit to manage its land in ways that contribute to the 
conservation of listed species on the property, protect and restore 
habitat, and are consistent with the recovery plan for the species.91 
The legislation also would have authorized the United States to 
compensate the property owner for the costs of implementing the 
agreement.  In the case of “Species Conservation Contract Agree-
ments,” compensation would be mandatory with the amount based 
on the length of time the land is managed for species or habitat con-
servation purposes:92 
10 years  60% compensation 
20 years  80% compensation 
30 years  100% compensation 
In addition, the bill stipulated that a landowner or resource user 
who is in compliance with these agreements shall be deemed to have 
a permit for enhancement or survival of species under section 
10(a)(1)(A) of the Act and shall therefore be deemed in compliance 
with the take limitations of the statute.93 
5. Consultation
Along with eliminating the directive to consider the adverse 
modification of critical habitat during the interagency consultation 
89. Id. § 9(c).
90. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 47.
91. H.R. 3824 § 9(c).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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process, H.R. 3824 would have made several other significant 
amendments to section 7 of the Act. 
By rulemaking, the USFWS could decide that certain types of 
federal agency action categorically comply with the substantive re-
quirements of section 7 — that, in other words, they would not jeop-
ardize the continued existence of an endangered or threatened 
species.94  In those cases where consultation is required, the consul-
tation could focus only on the possible effects on the species that 
would be caused by the proposed federal action, and the USFWS 
could not consider cumulative or synergistic effects that might result 
from the combined effects of the proposed action and other activities 
that might jeopardize the species.95  In addition, the legislation would 
have exempted agency action from consultation if the species is al-
ready protected by an HCP or by a species recovery or conservation 
agreement and the federal agency’s action is consistent with those 
existing protections.96 
Reasonable and prudent alternatives (“RPAs”) included in a bio-
logical opinion would have been limited in three respects:  First, 
RPAs must be “capable of successful implementation.”  Second, they 
“shall be roughly proportional to the impact of the incidental taking.” 
Third, the conditions must be consistent with the objectives of the 
federal agency (and the permit or license applicant) “to the greatest 
extent possible.”97 
Finally, the legislation would have eliminated the Endangered 
Species Committee and the exemption process.98 
6. Incidental Take Permits and Habitat Conservation Plans
The legislation also would have made several important changes 
to sections 9 and 10 of the Act.  Habitat conservation plans must con-
tain “objective, measurable biological goals to be achieved for spe-
cies covered by the plan and specific measures for achieving such 
goals.”99  They also must include “adaptive management provisions 
necessary to respond to all reasonably foreseeable changes in cir-
cumstances that could appreciably reduce the likelihood of the sur-
vival and recovery of any species covered by the plan.”100 
94. Id. § 11(a).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 11(b).
98. Id. § 11(d).
99. Id. § 12(a).
100. Id.
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If changed circumstances contemplated by the HCP occur, the 
USFWS may “require only such additional minimization, mitigation, 
or other measures as are already provided in the permit or incorpo-
rated document for such changed circumstance.”101  For any changed 
circumstance not identified in the HCP, the Service may “require only 
such additional minimization, mitigation, or other measures to ad-
dress such changed circumstance that do not involve the commit-
ment of any additional land, water, or financial compensation not 
otherwise committed, or the imposition of additional restrictions on 
the use of any land, water or other natural resources otherwise avail-
able for development or use, under the original terms and conditions 
of the permit or incorporated document.”102 
The USFWS would have the burden of proof in demonstrating 
and documenting, with the best available scientific data, the occur-
rence of any changed circumstances.103  Finally, consistent with the 
proposed amendment to section 7, the bill would have required that 
all the terms and conditions of all HCPs “be roughly proportional in 
extent to the impact of the incidental taking specified in the conser-
vation plan.”104 
7. Private Property Conservation
H.R. 3824 also included a section titled “Private Property Conser-
vation.”  This section would have authorized the USFWS to provide 
“conservation grants” to land owners and resources users to promote 
the voluntary conservation of endangered species and threatened spe-
cies.105  This authority would have complemented the recovery 
plan/land acquisition program described above.  But the “Private Prop-
erty Conservation” provisions of the bill also would have done some-
thing much more controversial:  compel the United States to 
compensate private property owners whose rights are burdened or di-
minished by conservation measures imposed on them under the Act. 
If a proposed use of private land would violate section 9(a) by 
taking a member of a protected species, and the landowner and the 
Service did not agree to an HCP, a “Species Recovery Agreement,” or 
“Species Conservation Contract,” the property owner would be enti-
tled to what the bill called “financial aid” in the amount of the “fair 
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 13(a).
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market value” of the prohibited use.106  To qualify for this financial aid, 
the property owner must establish that he or she decided not to en-
gage in the land or resource use that would violate section 9(a), that 
the “foregone use would be lawful under State and local law,” and 
that the property owner has the means to undertake the proposed 
use.”107  This section was modeled on, but would have significantly 
expanded, the just compensation requirements of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 
8. Consolidation of Agency Authority
Finally, H.R. 3824 would have consolidated all authority to ad-
minister the Endangered Species Act in the Secretary of the Interior. 
Specifically, it would have transferred all authority currently exercised 
by the Secretary of Commerce (acting through NMFS) over ocean 
fisheries, marine mammals, and anadromous fish to the Interior De-
partment.108  In addition, the legislation would have declared — for a 
period of five years — all actions taken in compliance with the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) to be 
automatically in compliance with the Endangered Species Act.109  A 
principal purpose of this amendment is to allow EPA registration of 
herbicides and pesticides to preclude review of specific uses of such 
registered chemicals by the Fish and Wildlife Service under section 7 
or section 9 of ESA. 
Evaluation 
Despite its author’s reputation, the Threatened and Endangered 
Species Recovery Act was a mixed bag.  Some of the proposed 
amendments were constructive — perhaps even salutary — although 
their benefits would have been equivocal.  More regularized peer re-
view of scientific studies and judgments that form the basis of listing, 
habitat protection, and consultation decisions under the Act, for ex-
ample, would likely enhance the decisionmaking process and lead to 
greater public acceptance of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s resources 
management decisions.  The accompanying elimination of “commer-
cial data” from the scientific information the USFWS must consider in 
106. Id. § 13(a), (d).  The bill would award financial aid in the amount of “the
fair market value of the foregone use of the affected portion of the private property, 
including business losses, is what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller in an 
open market.  Fair market value shall take into account the likelihood that the fore-
gone use would be approved under State and local law.”  Id. § 13(d). 
107. Id.
108. Id. § 21.
109. Id. § 20.
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making its listing, recovery, and consultation decisions, however, 
could have significantly impaired the Service’s ability to protect cer-
tain species.  For example, the USFWS’s decision to list the Delta 
Smelt as a threatened species was based on commercial trawling 
data, which indicated a dramatic and precipitous decline in the popu-
lation of the species.110 
Similarly, clarification of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s authority 
to negotiate conservation and habitat protection agreements and 
codification of the principles that underlie the “no surprises” policy 
would be likely to encourage more property right holders to attempt 
to achieve an accommodation of their land development and re-
source use goals with the species protection mandates of the Act. 
Yet, the bill’s requirement that the United States pay fair market 
value compensation to property owners whose rights are restricted 
through the section 9 regulatory process would have created a per-
verse incentive for these individuals not to sign a species recovery or 
species conservation agreement, because their rights to compensa-
tion may be greater under the mandatory compensation provisions of 
the legislation than under the negotiated agreement sections. 
Other proposed changes may have been benign in practice, al-
though one may distrust the motives of the legislation’s sponsors. 
For example, the proposed amendment to the listing provisions of 
section 4 to include analysis of the economic effects of listing new 
species — without the concomitant directive to weigh these eco-
nomic costs against the benefits of species protection — would be 
unlikely to change the existing administration of the statute.  In fact, 
in the right hands, these economic analyses could inform the Ser-
vice’s subsequent evaluation of habitat protection, land acquisition, 
conservation agreements, and other factors that it will need to ana-
lyze in formulating recovery plans for the species. 
Some aspects of H.R. 3824, however, would have seriously im-
paired our nation’s species conservation efforts.  The existing statu-
tory requirement that the USFWS must designate critical habitat 
concurrently with its listing of new species, especially when enforced 
through a long backlog of judicial orders in citizen lawsuits, has di-
verted the Service from more pressing priorities and has produced 
critical habitat maps that are often unnecessarily controversial and 
vulnerable in court.  But the bill’s meat cleaver response to this prob-
lem — elimination of the whole concept of “critical habitat” in con-
110. Determination of Threatened Status for the Delta Smelt, 58 Fed. Reg.
12854 (Mar. 5, 1993). Identification of the recent (and to date unexplained) decline in 
Delta Smelt populations in California’s Bay-Delta Estuary also was made on the ba-
sis of commercial trawling surveys complied by California Department of Water Re-
sources.  See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, DELTA SMELT 5-YEAR REVIEW (Mar. 31, 2004), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/cno/es/5yr.html (last visited November 11, 2006). 
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sultation, recovery, and evaluation whether private activities may vio-
late the “take” prohibition — would undermine the fundamental pur-
pose of the Act. 
Protection of habitat is essential to the preservation and propa-
gation of most endangered and threatened species.  Under H.R. 3824, 
although the Fish and Wildlife Service could consider the effects of 
proposed uses of land and natural resources on listed species and 
their habitat, it would have to do so on an ad hoc basis without the 
guidance of a general critical habitat designation that would alert the 
Service, the agencies with which it consults under section 7, and pri-
vate landowners and resources users who are potential subjects of 
regulation under section 9 that they may be encroaching on habitat 
that is essential to the survival of the protected species.  Moreover, 
because the proposed amendments to section 7 would have elimi-
nated all references to critical habitat in the consultation process, the 
Service could find that a proposed federal action would violate the 
“no jeopardy” directive only if it concludes that the action would be 
likely directly to place the survival of the species in peril or would in-
directly do so by altering habitat.  The precautionary aspects of the 
existing law — which categorically protects against destruction or 
adverse modification of critical habitat whether or not the species it-
self would be put at risk of extinction — thus would be lost.111 
Another deleterious aspect of H.R. 3824 was the five-year plan to 
allow EPA, rather than the USFWS, to have the sole power to regulate 
the use of pesticides and herbicides that might harm listed species or 
threaten their breeding and habitat.  This proposal was based on the 
doctrine of “functional equivalence” that EPA’s evaluation of chemi-
cals within its jurisdiction is an adequate substitute for additional, 
and perhaps duplicative, analysis by the Fish and Wildlife Service. 
This rationale, however, is disingenuous in two respects.   First, the 
legal standard that governs registration of herbicides and pesticides 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act is that 
the chemical will provide the benefits claimed by its proponents, and 
“when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized 
practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on 
the environment.”112  The concept of “reasonable” harm is antithetical 
111. Indeed, elimination of all references to critical habitat in section 7(a)(2)
would bring the consultation standard close to the definition of the take prohibition 
of section 9 affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Sweet Home case:  Federal agency 
action would violate section 7(a)(2) only if it would be likely to jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of listed species by killing or otherwise directly harming the species 
or by altering the species’ habitat in a way that “actually kills or injures wildlife by 
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or 
sheltering.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). 
112. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 3(c)(5), 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(5) (2006). 
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to the unconditional standard that currently applies during consulta-
tion between EPA and the USFWS — viz. that use of the registered 
chemical would not be likely to jeopardize the continued existence of 
and endangered or threatened species or adversely modify its critical 
habitat.113  Although FIFRA authorizes the suspension and cancella-
tion of registered herbicides and pesticides that present an “unrea-
sonable hazard to the survival of a species” listed for protection 
under the Endangered Species Act,114 this post hoc evaluation of risk is 
also based on a significantly less precautionary standard than applies 
now during consultation.  Second, EPA registration evaluates the ef-
fects of chemicals regulated under FIFRA only on a sampling of indi-
cator species.115  This testing protocol is not an adequate substitute 
for on-site analysis of the potential effects of the application of the 
pesticide or herbicide on a specific species under local ground, at-
mospheric, and hydrologic conditions. 
Finally, the private property compensation provisions of the bill 
were perhaps well-intentioned, but lacked appropriate subtlety.  H.R. 
3824 would have required the United States to pay property owners 
whose full land and resource use rights are limited by section 9 of the 
Act, unless the property owner and the FWS agree to an HCP or spe-
cies conservation agreement.  There are several problems with this 
compensation requirement. 
As described above, by providing compensation (or, to use the 
language of the bill, “financial aid”) to landowners whose property 
rights are restricted by section 9, the legislation would have created 
an incentive not to enter into the “Species Recovery Agreements” and 
“Species Conservation Contracts’ that were the focus of the Private 
Property Conservation reforms.  Moreover, the legislation would have 
provided compensation both for temporary and permanent restric-
tions on the use of the private property.  While this is a legitimate 
policy choice for Congress to make, I believe that the existing Su-
preme Court takings decisions draw an appropriate distinction be-
tween, say, a reduction on water service to ensure the migration and 
spawning of a protected species of salmon that may occur only dur-
ing times of drought and a permanent shortage caused by the long-
113. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
114. FIFRA § 6(b)-(c), 7 U.S.C. § 136(b)-(c); see FIFRA § 2(l), 7 U.S.C. § 136(l):
“The term ‘imminent hazard’ means a situation which exists when the continued use 
of a pesticide during the time required for cancellation proceeding would be likely to 
result in unreasonable adverse effects on the environment or will involve unreason-
able hazard to the survival of [an endangered or threatened species].” 
115. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA’S PROGRAM TO PROTECT EN-
DANGERED SPECIES FROM PESTICIDES (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/espp/ 
endspec.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006). 
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term reallocation of water from consumptive users to endangered 
species purposes.116 
Moreover, the compensation provisions of the legislation stated 
that the “foregone use” must be lawful under state and local law. 
This qualification failed to account, however, for other federal law re-
strictions on the exercise of property rights that should limit the right 
to compensation because the use would be prohibited by some other 
federal statute (such as section 404 of the Clean Water Act)117 or be-
cause the rights the property owner is asserting did not exist in the 
first place — for example, because the user’s water service contract or 
timber sales contract expressly exempts the United States from liabil-
ity under these circumstances.118 
Finally, H.R. 3824 would have authorized the appropriation of 
funds to the Fish and Wildlife Service both for negotiated compensa-
tion agreements such as the species conservation contracts and to 
pay the “financial aid” that is mandatory under the legislation.119  This 
means that all just compensation awards would come out of the Inte-
rior Department’s budget, which may have the effect of deterring the 
FWS from exercising its authority to impose land use restrictions on 
recalcitrant landowners, even in situations where protection of habi-
tat on the private property is essential to the species’ conservation 
and recovery.  If Congress chose not to appropriate sufficient funds 
for payment of compensation as required by the legislation, the Fish 
and Wildlife Service might find itself incapable of fulfilling its statu-
tory obligations to protect listed species. 
Conclusion 
Although H.R. 3824 is now a dead letter, the House of Represen-
tatives’ approval of the bill served the purpose of bringing our na-
116. See Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002) (temporary moratorium on development of real property pending comple-
tion of a comprehensive land use plan is not a taking per se); cf. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (reduction in water supply for one 
water year caused by a combination of drought and the mandates of the Endangered 
Species Act is a taking per se). 
Representative Jay Inslee offered an amendment in committee to require landowners 
seeking compensation to demonstrate that the application of section 9 to restrict the 
use of private property for the benefit of listed species would constitute a taking of 
property as defined by the Fifth Amendment.  The amendment failed on a roll call 
vote of 10 to 27.  H.R. Rep. No. 109-237 (2005). 
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
118. See, e.g., O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995) (shortage provi-
sion in federal reclamation contract exempts United States from liability for reduc-
tion in water service caused by drought and Endangered Species Act requirements). 
119. H.R. 3824 § 18.
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tional endangered species policy back to the public’s attention.  The 
decision whether to protect particular endangered species — or to 
continue the monumental task of trying to preserve all endangered 
and threatened species against the threats posed by modern eco-
nomics and growing populations — is fundamentally a policy choice; 
and that policy (i.e., political choice) should be made anew by each 
generation. 
It has been more than a generation since the Endangered Spe-
cies Act was enacted, and our national circumstances and values 
have changed dramatically over the intervening three decades.  We 
did not have an adequate political debate in 1973 on the essential 
questions posed by the statute: 
• Why do we care about species protection?
• Do we literally want to preserves all endangered species of
vertebrates, invertebrates, and plants?
• Do we want to do so regardless of cost and inconvenience?
• And who should bear the burden of those unavoidable
costs?  The taxpayers generally?  Or only those who are
privileged to own land, timber, water rights, and other valu-
able natural resources, but who are unlucky that their lands
and resources also happen to be the last remaining habitat
for these species of concern?
The House of Representative conducted only a cursory analysis 
of these difficult and important policy questions — devoting only one 
day to committee hearings120 and less than one and one-half hours to 
the floor debate121 — and the Senate took no action on the legislation 
during the fifteen months H.R. 3824 resided with the Committee on 
Environment and Public Works.122  The criticisms of the current En-
dangered Species Act are unlikely to be diminished or muted by the 
passage of time, however, and we may expect the 110th Congress to 
consider the challenges and controversies of endangered species 
regulation. 
True reform legislation must preserve those features of existing 
law that are essential to the survival of threatened and endangered 
species.  These include the listing of species based on population 
120. 151 Cong. Rec. D945 (Sept. 21, 2005).
121. 151 Cong. Rec. H8535-84 (Sept. 29, 2005).
122. See 151 Cong. Rec. S10796 (Sept. 30, 2005) (H.R. 3824 referred to Senate
after passage by the House of Representatives). 
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data, habitat loss, and science, rather than a more free-ranging calcu-
lus that would embrace economic costs, private property interests, 
and other factors that would allow the two Services to balance the 
survival of species with human convenience or expediency.  A revised 
Endangered Species Act also must preserve the concept of critical 
habitat, while integrating both the definition and administration of 
that habitat more fully into recovery, consultation, and habitat con-
servation planning.  Most importantly, a viable and constructive En-
dangered Species Reform Act must reiterate the overarching directive 
of the current law that all actions taken under the Act must be consis-
tent with the preservation and recovery of the protected species. 
The past 34 years have demonstrated that the existing statute is 
not perfect, however, and the new Congress would be well-advised to 
address the more controversial aspects of endangered species man-
agement.  Peer review of listing decisions, critical habitat designa-
tion, recovery plans, biological opinions, and HCPs would help to 
enhance both the policy determinations and the public’s confidence 
in those decisions.  The exigencies of species protection often may 
require that this peer review occur post hoc, however, and later be in-
corporated into the implementation and revision of the initial deci-
sions.  The experience of the Clinton Administration and both Bush 
Administrations also indicates that greater flexibility in the designa-
tion of critical habitat is desirable.  Congress might choose to amend 
the statute, for example, to allow the Services to designate critical 
habitat after listing based on a finding that delayed designation 
would improve the Service’s overall administration of the Act and 
would not jeopardize the continued existence of the species in ques-
tion or result in the loss or adverse modification of habitat that the 
Service believes may be critical for the survival and recovery of the 
species. 
Indeed, the intersection between the species preservation direc-
tives of the statute and private property designated as critical habitat 
for the species is the fulcrum of the contemporary controversies over 
the Endangered Species Act.  Reform legislation therefore also must 
direct the Services, in implementing both the consultation require-
ments of section 7 and the take prohibitions of section 9, to analyze 
the effects of their proposed species protection decisions on private 
property (including the use of land, water, and other resources over 
which the United States has jurisdiction) and where appropriate to 
enter into agreements with the affected property owners that mini-
mize or mitigate the necessary limitations on the private property 
rights.  The Clinton Administration’s HCP and “no surprises” policies 
should serve as a model for this component of the legislation, rather 
than the overly broad compensation directives of H.R. 3824, with 
their counterproductive incentives for property owners to claim “fi-
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nancial aid” rather than attempt in good faith to negotiate a habitat 
conservation plan. 
Finally, consolidation of endangered species jurisdiction in the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is probably a good idea.  As long as the 
experience and expertise of the National Marine Fisheries Service 
with ocean and anadromous fish is preserved by transferring key per-
sonnel from NMFS to USFWS, the advantages of unified and inte-
grated endangered species regulation in a single entity would far 
outweigh the transitional costs.  The coordinated management of the 
Central Valley Project and the State Water Project under the umbrella 
of joint consultation with NMFS and USFWS to protect the salmonid 
and freshwater fisheries of the Bay-Delta Ecosystem is an excellent 
example of integrated, interagency species protection. 
If the Democratic leaders of the 110th Congress decide to place 
endangered species reform on their legislative agenda, perhaps the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 and the Threatened and Endangered 
Species Recovery Act of 2005 will serve as bookends to the public de-
bate over our future endangered species policy. 
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